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ABSTRACT 
 
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems are widely used to assist or 
automate decision-making. Although there are general metrics for the 
performance of AI systems, there is, as yet, no well-established gauge to 
assess the quality of particular AI recommendations or decisions. This 
presents a serious problem in the emerging use of AI in legal applications 
because the legal system aims for good performance not only in the 
aggregate but also in individual cases. This Article presents the concept of 
using nearest neighbors to assess individual AI output. This nearest 
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neighbor analysis has the benefit of being easy to understand and apply for 
judges, lawyers, and juries. In addition, it is fundamentally compatible 
with existing AI methodologies. This Article explains how the concept 
could be applied for probing AI output in a number of use cases, including 
civil discovery, risk prediction, and forensic comparison, while also 
presenting its limitations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The accelerating adoption of AI to generate recommendations or 
decisions is starting to have a serious impact on the economy and in our 
daily lives. Unsurprisingly, it has prompted endless discussions in the legal 
literature, from how it may change the legal practice to how substantive 
law should adapt to widespread AI usage. What is missing, however, is a 
discussion about how to assess AI output in the legal context. This is 
especially important because legal decision-makers will be called upon to 
look into the quality of decision-making assisted or automated by AI.  
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The technical literature has discussed some of these issues. 
Mathematical metrics such as “recall” and “precision” exist for the 
evaluation of the quality of AI output.1 But those metrics are aggregate 
measures for evaluating the overall performance of AI. They are not 
always applicable to the legal context, which often requires evaluation of 
the quality of a single recommendation or decision.2  
Consider, for example, a judge receiving a recidivism assessment 
about a particular convict from an AI-driven risk prediction3 instrument 
(“RPI”). Although the overall quality of the AI recidivism assessments is 
important information, it is no less valuable for the judge to have some 
sense of the quality of the particular assessment for that particular convict.  
In addition, these metrics may not be intuitive to legal decision-
makers. Things may change in the future, but any fair evaluation of 
judicial systems today must conclude that the decision-makers from jurors 
to judges are, as a whole, not highly skilled in interpretation of data and 
AI output in particular. It is therefore helpful to have metrics for evaluating 
AI output that are easy for laypersons to understand. 
The proposal of alternative metrics, however, is not a simple task.4 
After all, metrics need to be technically feasible and consistent with the 
methodologies of AI.  
In this Article, we propose the notion of the nearest neighbor analysis 
(“NNA”) to assess AI output geared for the legal system at an individual 
level.5 Suppose that an AI makes a recommendation or renders a decision 
 
1. See, e.g., STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
MODERN APPROACH 869 (3d ed. 2010); KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 114 (2017); Kai 
Ming Ting, Precision and Recall, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA 
MINING 990, 990 (Claude Sammut & Geoffrey I. Webb eds., 2d ed. 2017). 
2. See David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific 
Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 420 (2014) (discussing “the challenge of 
reasoning from group data to decisions about individuals”).  
3. Although ubiquitously used to refer to AI output, the term “prediction” is usually 
misleading because it suggests a deterministic assertion about the future. But AI output 
involves uncertainty—most often in a probabilistic sense—so the output is more 
appropriately, though less stylishly, termed “prevision” or “forecast.” See EUR. COMM’N 
FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, EUROPEAN ETHICAL CHARTER ON THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT 30 (2018) [hereinafter 
EUROPEAN ETHICAL AI CHARTER]; Alex Biedermann et al., Prediction in Forensic Science: 
A Critical Examination of Common Understandings, 6 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 737 (2015), 
available at https://bit.ly/2wLuuQE. 
4. Though the ultimate hope in AI research is to create explainable AI that is capable 
of defending individual decisions or recommendations, such AI does not exist today and 
likely will not be available over the medium term. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-18-142SP, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES, 
CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS 18–19 (2018). 
5. There may be times when the legal system will be required to evaluate AI output 
that is not geared towards the legal process. For example, a court may be asked to look into 
a crash of a self-driving car caused by a particular turn taken by the car. Although the focus 
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for a particular legal problem, and the legal decision-maker seeks to 
understand the trustworthiness of the AI output. In simplistic terms, NNA 
seeks to assist with this inquiry by searching for precedent cases with 
features similar to the legal problem at hand so as to allow for a 
comparison. 
The concept of nearest neighbors is old and well-established in fields 
such as physics and computer science.6 Here, we explain how nearest 
neighbors can be incorporated into legal analysis in a way comparable to 
the established use of precedent cases by lawyers. The added value of 
NNA is that it provides a focused and empirical examination of specific 
AI output beyond standard aggregate AI performance metrics. Our 
perspective also has the benefit of being explainable in principle and 
implementable with the many AI algorithms already in existence.7 Our 
purpose is not to promote NNA as an exclusive assessment template, as it 
is by no means an all-encompassing, perfect concept. However, we 
propose nearest neighbors as additional information that legal users of AI 
could ask for that may be helpful in their decision-making. 
Some of the mainstream discussion and controversy portray AI as a 
threat to legal practice, in particular, regarding the extent to which AI may 
or ought to influence legal proceedings and decision-making. In this 
Article, we take a different view. We start by recognizing the reality that 
AI is already being used and referred to at various instances in the legal 
process. This, for us, is a reason to focus on how to suitably comprehend 
AI output at an individual level. Although many take a rather defensive 
approach by challenging algorithms on aspects such as robustness, error 
rates, bias, and transparency, we choose a more proactive perspective. We 
seek to encourage participants in the legal process to request additional AI 
output—specifically, nearest neighbor data—that is not commonly 
delivered or requested today. Scrutinizing AI and its output in legal 
applications at an individual level should contribute to a better informed, 
more transparent, and more defensible practice, which is preferable to 
passive attitudes that allow AI to “take over” the legal arena.  
 
of this Article is on AI output for legal applications, the concept of NNA may also be used 
by legal decision-makers for evaluating AI output in other contexts as well. 
6. See DAVID L. POOLE & ALAN K. MACKWORTH, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS 321 (2d ed. 2017); KEVIN P. MURPHY, 
MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 16 (2012). 
7. One benefit of NNA is that the analysis can be conducted without the need for 
source code. An aspect related to the use of algorithms in the law, but not dealt with in this 
Article, is the availability and review of computer source code, especially in cases where 
the code is used to generate evidence against defendants. For a general discussion of this 
subject matter, see, for example, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A 
Source of the Growing Controversy Over the Reliability of Automated Forensic 
Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 111–30 (2016).  
2020 ASSESSING AI OUTPUT IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 613 
This Article is structured as follows. Part II provides a brief overview 
of AI and its incorporation into legal decision-making. Part III begins by 
explaining problems related to conventional methods of evaluating AI 
output. Part III also explores the concept of a nearest neighbor using 
simple illustrations, and then discusses how NNA can be used to assess AI 
output in general. Part 0 then provides a comparative perspective by 
investigating some selected legal applications that rely to varying extents 
on the use of AI and that exhibit different stages of technical development. 
Further, Part IV provides suggestions for using NNA in evaluating AI 
output within these specific areas. 
II. AI USAGE IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 
A. Definition of AI 
Any discussion of AI must first acknowledge that there is no 
universally accepted definition of AI.8 It is possible to define AI from a 
pragmatic point of view, based on whether the AI is used for purposes that 
require “intelligence:” “a computerized system that exhibits behavior that 
is commonly thought of as requiring intelligence.”9 Another way to define 
AI is based on whether the AI is actually “intelligent:” “A set of scientific 
methods, theories and techniques whose aim is to reproduce, by a machine, 
the cognitive abilities of human beings.”10 
In this Article, we will use the former, that is, the pragmatic definition 
of AI. This use-based definition of AI is relatively broad. On one hand, it 
captures the many types of applications which everyone at this time would 
think of as AI, such as self-driving cars and poker-playing programs. On 
the other hand, it includes algorithms11 that may seem relatively 
“unintelligent,” such as brute force optimizations, or may seem like 
routine “data processing,” such as solving equations. 
A broad, use-based definition of AI is helpful when discussing AI for 
legal applications. The general users of AI within the legal field are not 
likely to be particularly technologically savvy. They may treat AI tools as 
“black box” oracles without discrimination as to the actual sophistication 
of the underlying algorithm because they lack the training or capability to 
do so. For example, such users may use an AI tool based on logistical 
regression as they may use an AI tool based on neural networks. They may 
 
8. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 6 (2016).   
9. Id. 
10. EUROPEAN ETHICAL AI CHARTER, supra note 3, at 69. 
11. An “algorithm” is a sequence of instructions that a computer can execute, starting 
from an initial point and input information and leading to a final state. See, e.g., Conor 
Ryan, Computer Algorithms in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
507, 507 (3d ed., 2003), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-12-227410-5/00840-1. 
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do so even though the two tools differ greatly in terms of technology and 
may yield different results under certain circumstances. This Article is 
concerned with providing general suggestions to legal users of AI about 
how to evaluate AI output in legal applications, and therefore uses a 
definition of AI consistent with their use of AI. 
B. Gradations of Automation and the Need for Assessment 
Tools 
Within legal applications, the task that requires intelligence is 
decision-making. And in this field, AI are computer tools to assist or 
automate decision-making. Before we begin, we need to more fully 
contextualize what AI is used for in legal decision-making. From a 
conceptual level, decision-making can be thought of as comprising two 
steps, one of evaluation and one of decision. Evaluation is the assessment 
of the relative plausibility or probability of competing propositions based 
on the available evidence. After evaluation comes decision, the acceptance 
of a proposition as a conclusion. Absent a decision criterion, no defensible 
conclusion can be made. 
The need to distinguish between evaluation and decision arises from 
uncertainty.12 Where there is uncertainty, legal decision-makers cannot 
make decisions based their understanding of the evidence alone. Instead, 
they must also consider their preferences among decision consequences.13 
As a result, a decision criterion fundamentally includes value judgments.  
Consider a situation in which there is a fingermark of unknown 
source (“U”) found on the crime scene. There is a defendant whose 
reference fingerprint (“K”) is available. The following figure illustrates 
the conceptual difference between evaluation and decision in the context 
of determining whether the defendant is the source of U. 
 
12. If there were no uncertainty at the time a decision had to be made, there would be 
no decision problem. It would be possible to directly select the course of action that would 
lead to an accurate outcome or, more generally, the best decision consequence given the 
known state of affairs. 
13. See Eric J. Horvitz et al., Decision Theory in Expert Systems and Artificial 
Intelligence, 2 INT’L J. APPROXIMATE REASONING 247, 253–54 (1988). 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the difference between evaluation and 
decision in the context of forensic comparison. 
 
In the evaluative step, the differences and similarities between U and 
K are measured. These measurements are assessed for whether and to what 
extent they support the hypothesis that the defendant is the source of U. 
One may, for example, be drawn to think that the defendant is the source 
of U because one observes many similarities and few unexplainable 
differences between U and K.  
In the decision step, the legal decision-maker must decide whether 
the defendant is the source of U. In doing this, the decision-maker must 
answer the key question of whether he or she should do so. The answer 
depends on the observed distance between the collected mark and the 
reference print. But it also incorporates value determinations. For 
example, the decision-maker must consider the drawback associated with 
a false identification compared to the drawback associated with a false 
non-identification. To wrongly associate defendant with U is after all to 
“miss” the true source of the fingermark. If the loss or damage resulting 
from a false identification were particularly severe, the decision-maker 
might decide not to identify the defendant as the source of U, despite a 
strong belief in the truth of the proposition.14 
 
14. See Alex Biedermann & Joëlle Vuille, Understanding the Logic of Forensic 
Identification Decisions (Without Numbers), 2018 SUI-GENERIS S. 397, S. 404–05 (2018); 
see also Simon A. Cole & Alex Biedermann, How Can a Forensic Result Be a 
“Decision”?: A Critical Analysis of Ongoing Reforms of Forensic Reporting Formats for 
Federal Examiners, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 551, 566–70 (2020). 
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This complication of decision under uncertainty attends virtually all 
situations of legal decision-making. Though the fundamental ingredients 
of decisions under uncertainty are widely agreed, opinions on how to make 
decisions in light of these ingredients are diverging.15 Formal methods 
based on decision theory, which incorporates probability as a measure of 
uncertainty, were proposed as early as the 1960s16 and have been heavily 
debated since then.17 Whatever decision model is used, it is still necessary 
to choose and implement a particular decision framework, otherwise no 
decision is made.  
This distinction between evaluation and decision may seem 
extremely formalistic. But it is crucial to understand the distinction in 
connection with the present state of AI technology. AI scientists recognize 
assisted or automated decision-making itself as a spectrum, defined in 
terms of the amount of human input necessary to complement the AI 
output. For example, the Society of Automotive Engineers (“SAE”) has 
provided the following diagram to illustrate the graduations of assistance 
and automation18 in the context of driving: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. See Ronald J. Allen, Artificial Intelligence and the Evidentiary Process: The 
Challenges of Formalism and Computation, 9 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 99, 108–14 
(2001). 
16. See generally John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 
STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968) (explaining how decision theory may be used in legal 
factfinding in criminal trials).  
17. See, e.g., Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the 
Supreme Court’s Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 
557–58 (1987); D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision 
Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1, 1–4 (1999); Richard O. Lempert, 
Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1021–22 (1977). 
18. As seen in the diagram, the SAE only regards automation at “level 3” or above as 
“automated.” The definition of AI used in this Article is broader. 
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Figure 2: SAE automated driving level definitions (SAE J3016). 
 
 Within the legal field, there is at this time no similar agreed definition 
of the gradations of automation. However, it is not difficult to adapt the 
concept to legal work. Take the drafting of a legal document, for example. 
At the lower levels of automation is a software tool that provides case law 
research, such as the more modern iterations of WestLaw, LexisNexis, and 
Casetext. Such AI can only provide evaluative assistance. It is not ready 
to make any decision without human input. The output is in the form of 
recommendations for human decision-makers to use in their own legal 
drafting work. At the higher end of automation, there may be a software 
tool that actually performs the legal drafting and leaves the humans with a 
“minimum” number of edits and approvals. The AI moves beyond 
evaluative assistance and closer towards an automated maker of decisions. 
 The level of automation is, in some sense, about the level of deference 
humans are willing to entrust to AI.19 After all, a tool that provides 
recommendations can be transformed instantly into a tool that makes 
decisions by blind acceptance of all the recommendations. Thus, allowing 
 
19. The notion of deference has been discussed in legal literature in the context of 
understanding the role of specialized expertise in the legal process. See generally Ronald 
J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or 
Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993).  
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AI to make decisions instead of recommendations would mean deferring 
to the value system either built into the AI or into AI use processes.20 
 It is difficult to articulate with any precision how much decision-
making responsibility should be given to AI.21 At the very least, the 
amount of delegated responsibility should take into consideration the level 
of automation of the AI, the difficulty of the problem presented to the AI, 
and the importance of the problem.  
 For example, this Article discusses the example of civil discovery, 
where AI output is not all individually reviewed by humans. With respect 
to the production of millions of responsive documents from one litigant to 
another, the probability that any single document in a document collection 
will decide the entire case is slight. The technical difficulty of determining 
whether an individual document is responsive or not is not particularly 
high. To that extent, it may be acceptable to cede to AI the decision-
making authority over whether to produce individual documents, even if 
the AI is not particularly sophisticated.  
 In contrast, forensic science may have strong and close implications 
on the welfare, life, and liberty of the accused. The technical difficulty of 
the evaluation could be considerable. It may be necessary to confine AI, 
however trustworthy, to do no more than provide an evaluative function. 
 This Article does not aim to resolve where to strike the line between 
using AI for evaluation and for decision. Instead, it acknowledges the 
divide merely as a starting point, and proceeds to describe NNA as a 
concept for assessing AI recommendations created in the evaluative step 
of decision-making and also for reviewing AI automated decisions.  
 
20. See POOLE & MACKWORTH, supra note 6, at 439. 
21. Humans can certainly entrust decision-making authority to AI even when the AI 
was not designed for such a purpose. This problem is well-publicized in the context of 
driving. In its accident report concerning a fatal crash of a Tesla car under autopilot into a 
semitrailer, the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) stated: 
To summarize the discussion of the . . . driver’s actions before the crash, he used 
the Autopilot system on roadways for which it was not designed . . . and had 
extended periods of hands-off driving and other indications of lack of 
engagement/awareness before the crash . . . . Both driver behaviors strongly 
indicate that, although the Tesla owner’s manual provided information and 
warnings on these subjects, the driver either did not know of or did not heed the 
guidance in the manual. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the Tesla driver’s 
pattern of use of the Autopilot system indicates an overreliance on the 
automation and a lack of understanding of system limitations. Also, the NTSB 
concludes that the Tesla driver was not attentive to the driving task . . . .  
NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/HAR-17/02 PB2017-102600, 
COLLISION BETWEEN A CAR OPERATING WITH AUTOMATED VEHICLE CONTROL SYSTEMS 
AND A TRACTOR-SEMITRAILER TRUCK NEAR WILLISTON, FLORIDA MAY 7, 2016, 35–36 
(2017). 
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C. Nature of AI Output 
 AI may seem like magic for readers unfamiliar with the concept. 
However, its process is fundamentally based on precedents22 and obeys 
this fundamental process: 
1) collect assessments or outcomes for known cases, ideally 
ground truth responses; and 
2) synthesize a response to the new situation based on the known 
responses to the known cases. 
In this process, a decision boundary,23 which separates one class from 
another, is formed. Take, for example, an AI designed for identifying cats 
in pictures. The system will be supplied with many pictures, all tagged as 
either having cats or not having cats, which will serve as the ground truth 
and will be used as its training set. When given a new picture and called 
upon to decide whether there is a cat in the picture, the AI would decide 
whether the picture has a cat based on the training set.24 This general 
concept of using AI to make recommendations or decisions driven by 
precedents has already been widely implemented in the legal realm.25 
 Lawyers and judges are well familiar with this process flow. When 
confronted with a legal problem, they search through the precedent for 
 
22. The following diagram summarizes the process flow of a typical, modern AI 
machine learning process: 
 
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 19 (with adaptations). 
23. “Decision boundary” is an accepted technical term of art in the field of data 
science. It will therefore be used in this article whether the context is evaluation or decision. 
24. We emphasize that this is a strongly simplified description and that practical 
applications face many challenges and anomalies. For an example, see Anh Nguyen et al., 
Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for 
Unrecognizable Images, in COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION (CVPR ‘15), 
IEEE 427, 432–34 (2015).  
25. In the field of forensic science, AI is used to generate candidate suggestions based 
on input images. See Che-Yen Wen & Jing-Yue Yao, Pistol image retrieval by shape 
representation, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Dec. 2005, at 35, 35 (discussing the use of input 
images of pistols); Daniel Moreira et al., Pornography classification: The hidden clues in 
video space-time, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Nov. 2016, at 46, 47 (discussing the use of input 
images to classify videos as pornography). Law enforcement agencies also use AI to, for 
example, identify potential investment advisor misconduct in new regulatory filings based 
on examples of previously examined filings. See Scott W. Bauguess, Acting Dir., Div. of 
Econ. & Risk Analysis, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at OpRisk North America 
2017 (June 21, 2017) (transcript available at https://bit.ly/34tHI14). 
Training
Data
Machine 
Learning 
Process
Learned 
Function
Task
User
Decision or 
Recommendation
620 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:3 
similar cases.26 They then compare the legal problem at hand with the 
precedent cases to look for similarities or differences in the underlying 
facts. They use the outcomes of the precedent cases to guide them to a 
recommendation or decision. Although they do not use formalized terms 
such as decision boundary, they do refer to their own actions as “line-
drawing.” Our discussion here is therefore directed to adapting a mode of 
reasoning that has been at the core of the legal system for centuries towards 
analysis of AI output. 
 Humans exhibit a great deal of variation in how they extend precedent 
to answer new cases. Lawyers and judges, for example, may look for 
patterns, identifying rules and standards. They may apply doctrines such 
as the maxims of equity. Where the new case matches or almost exactly 
maps onto a particular case in the precedent, they may decide based on 
that one case alone. 
 AI recommendation or decision is, in this way, not all that different 
from human decision. As with humans, there is great variation in how each 
AI methodology “extends” the training set to deal with situations that do 
not fall directly within the training set.27 Techniques such as neural 
networks look for “features” within the training set that can best account 
for the known correct responses and then look for these “features” in new 
cases. Watson, an IBM computer well-known for winning Jeopardy!, used 
an “expanded corpus” built from a merger of “informative nuggets” rather 
than pattern recognition.28 Mathematics, physics, and other scientific 
knowledge can also be used to extend the training set to handle new 
situations. More advanced machines, like self-driving cars, may use a 
combination of methods. How to do this “better” is the work of research.  
 In short, the fundamental process of AI recommendation or decision-
making is not magic and can be analogized to human behavior. Moreover, 
both recommendation and actual decision-making can be blended with the 
logic of decision analysis, specifically, decision theory. 
III. NEAREST NEIGHBORS 
A. Problems with Conventional Methods of Evaluating AI 
 
26. See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U CHI. L. REV. 501, 
501 (1948).  
27. The training set can itself be extended by the technique of data augmentation or 
enrichment. See, e.g., Zahraa S. Abdallah et al., Data Preparation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA MINING 318, 321 (Claude Sammut & Geoffrey I. Webb 
eds., 2017). 
28. See David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An Overview of the DeepQA Project, 
AI MAG., Fall 2010, at 59, 69 (2010). 
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Output 
In real-world applications, recommendation or decision-making based 
on precedents is rarely ever perfect. This is true either because precedents 
are wrongly applied or because existing precedents are insufficient to 
cover a new, unexpected problem. By nature, there must be some entity 
with the authority to make the ultimate call.  
 Nonetheless, it is a practical necessity that, at least some of the time, 
recommendations or decisions be made based on precedents. After all, it 
would not be efficient for the final authority to make all the calls itself. No 
one in the legal field would think it appropriate for the highest court to 
decide all issues in all cases within the jurisdiction. Instead, everyone 
accepts the practicality of having lower courts apply precedents. Likewise, 
the idea behind AI assistance in or automation of decision-making is to 
reduce the amount of human work needed to make decisions.  
 But the question of how recommendations or decisions should be 
evaluated is a difficult problem. To that end, it is necessary to distinguish 
between aggregate measures of overall performance and measures of the 
quality of an individual recommendation or decision. This problem is well-
recognized in the field of forensic science: 
[T]he overall performance of an expert—as monitored across repeated 
exercises (tests) under controlled conditions—is not a direct measure 
of the ‘goodness’ of a particular decision (to be) made in a given case 
at hand. Stated otherwise, general performance indicators of an expert, 
including any technical system or device that is used during the 
analysis process, do not answer the question of how ‘good’—or 
accurate (when an underlying truth state can be considered)—an 
individual decision is.29 
This distinction exists in the evaluation of recommendations or decisions 
made by human experts as well as AI. 
 The importance of this distinction can be observed with a 
hypothetical. Let us imagine an appellate court reviewing a district court’s 
decision. The appellate court has, on the one hand, the opinion that 
contains the reasoning of the district court. On the other hand, the appellate 
court has the reversal rates of that district court. Which should the 
appellate court consider in its review? Even if reversal rates were valid 
measures of performance, no one would tolerate appellate review by such 
 
29. See Alex Biedermann et al., A formal approach to qualifying and quantifying the 
‘goodness’ of forensic identification decisions, 17 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 299 
(2018); see also Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 420. 
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overall performance metrics without regard to the particularities of the 
decision. 
 The same logic is true whenever a legal decision-maker has occasion 
to evaluate AI output. When a court is presented with an RPI assessment 
of a particular convict’s potential for recidivism, it would at best be 
helpful, but not entirely sufficient, to know the overall performance of the 
RPI. It would seem appropriate for the court to have some indication about 
how well the RPI would perform with regard to particularities of the 
convict. Similarly, when assessing the trustworthiness of a forensic 
expert’s AI-assisted identification of a low-quality fingermark,30 a court 
may wish to know about the performance of the process with comparable 
trace materials rather than information about the general performance.31 
And when a court is tasked to consider why a “smoking gun” document 
was not produced in an AI-driven document review process, the court may 
be interested to learn about why that specific document was not produced 
as opposed to the general measures of the document review process. 
 These particularities present a deep challenge. As of now, there are 
many well-established and accepted metrics of overall performance of 
decision-making. Table 1 summarizes the four basic metrics that are used 
for evaluations of performance against ground truths.32  
 
 Actual condition 
Positive Negative 
Asserted 
condition 
Positive True positive (TP) False positive (FP) 
Negative False negative (FN) True negative (TN) 
 
 
30. In this Article, a fingerprint is understood as a print—usually of good quality—
taken from a person of interest under controlled conditions. See CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET 
AL., FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS 317 (Max Houck ed., 2016). 
Examples include an inked print on a ten-print card or a scan of a finger’s ridge patterns. 
A fingerprint is distinguished from a fingermark, which refers to an impression—of 
varying quality—left by ridge skin on a receptor surface by an unknown person. See id. A 
fingermark may be visible or latent and require an enhancement and/or lifting technique in 
order to be recorded and further processed. See, e.g., Didier Meuwly, Forensic Use of 
Fingerprints and Fingermarks, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOMETRICS 723, 734 (Stan Z. Li & 
Anil K. Jain eds., 2015). 
31. While high quality fingerprints of a given person exhibit only small variations so 
that current algorithms are able to perform reasonably well and can be run in fully 
automated mode, the processing of partial, blurry or smeared fingermarks requires more 
human intervention. See Davide Maltoni & Raffaele Cappelli, Fingerprint Recognition, in 
HANDBOOK OF BIOMETRICS 23, 31 (Anil K. Jain et al. eds., 2008). 
32. See, e.g., POOLE & MACKWORTH, supra note 6, at 279. 
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Table 1: Simple example of a confusion matrix for outcomes that are 
classified into the two categories of “positive” and “negative.” 
 
These four metrics form the basis of more elaborate metrics,33 which exist 
in different fields under varying names,34 such as sensitivity, specificity, 
positive predictive value, among others.35  
 But there is nothing similar in rigor and ease of use for assessing the 
quality of an individual AI output. The problem comes, in part, from the 
inability of many existing AI systems to explain themselves36 and from the 
inadequacy of AI determination of the quality of its own assessments.37 
For example, the reader may recall Watson, an IBM computer, and its 
comprehensive victory over the best human Jeopardy! players in a 2011 
exhibition match. At the “Final Jeopardy” round of the first night of the 
two days of competition, Watson and its human competition were given 
the following clue under the category of “U.S. Cities:” “Its largest airport 
was named for a World War II hero; its second largest, for a World War II 
battle.” The correct answer was, “What is Chicago?” The airports named 
for the World War II hero and battle were, respectively, O’Hare and 
Midway. Watson at that point had a large, insurmountable lead over the 
human contestants. Still, it famously blundered, with “What is 
Toronto???,” making reference to a city which is not even in the United 
States.  
 In response to the intense public interest, IBM provided this 
explanation for Watson’s mistake: 
How could the machine have been so wrong? David Ferrucci, the 
manager of the Watson project . . ., explained . . . that several things 
probably confused Watson. First, the category names on Jeopardy! are 
tricky. The answers often do not exactly fit the category. Watson, in 
 
33. See Kai Ming Ting, Confusion Matrix, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MACHINE LEARNING 
AND DATA MINING 260, 260 (Claude Sammut & Geoffrey I. Webb eds., 2d ed. 2017). 
34. The divergence in names of the metrics originates from the different fields 
independently arriving at the same concepts to evaluate performance. The metric known 
as “precision” in the field of information retrieval, for example, is known as “positive 
predictive value” in the field of epidemiology.  
35. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Validity of Tests: Caveat Omnes, 27 JURIMETRICS 
J. 349, 351 (1987); Aakifa Aamir & Robert G. Hamilton, Predictive Value Model for 
Laboratory Tests: Diagnostic Sensitivity, Diagnostic Specificity, Positive and Negative 
Predictive Value, Efficiency, Likelihood Ratio ([positive and negative]), Incidence and 
Prevalence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL IMMUNOLOGY 581 (Ian R. Mackay et al. eds., 
2014).   
36. This is an active area of AI research. 
37. As discussed further in Section IV.C, some applications in forensic science 
attempt to remedy this by focusing on assessing the probative value of a given comparison 
score using score distributions for competing versions of an event of interest. 
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his training phase, learned that categories only weakly suggest the kind 
of answer that is expected, and, therefore, the machine downgrades 
their significance. The way the language was parsed provided an 
advantage for the humans and a disadvantage for Watson, as well. 
“What US city” wasn’t in the question. If it had been, Watson would 
have given US cities much more weight as it searched for the answer. 
Adding to the confusion for Watson, there are cities named Toronto in 
the United States and the Toronto in Canada has an American League 
baseball team. It probably picked up those facts from the written 
material it has digested. Also, the machine didn’t find much evidence 
to connect either city’s airport to World War II. (Chicago was a very 
close second on Watson’s list of possible answers.) So this is just one 
of those situations that’s a snap for a reasonably knowledgeable human 
but a true brain teaser for the machine.38 
 The substantive explanation provided by IBM is, in all likelihood, an 
accurate description of the “thinking” process of Watson. It may make 
sense from a machine point of view. But it cannot be considered a 
satisfying explanation as to why “Toronto” was a good answer to the 
question. Associating “U.S. city” with “American League baseball” is 
simply not human logic. AI does not “reason” like a human and, until the 
technology of AI explanation greatly improves, any explanation of how it 
arrived at its answer will always seem cryptic and unusable. 
 Measures such as confidence may be useful but are also problematic. 
To begin with, “confidence” in statistics is a conflictual notion in its own 
right. Indeed, it has been argued that adding a probability assertion with 
another value thought to assert the “confidence” in the assigned 
probability would amount to “an infinite regress of beliefs about beliefs 
about beliefs.”39  
 Also, asking AI about its confidence is akin to asking a human expert 
how confident he or she is in a particular decision. Confidence is relative, 
based on the knowledge of the expert, and may be unique to particular 
cases. The testimony of an expert who declares he is “completely 
confident” in the results is not necessarily easier to trust than that of an 
expert who declares that she is “quite confident.” The human expert must 
accompany the confidence statement with explanation to be believed.40 
 
38. See Steve Hamm, Watson on Jeopardy! Day Two: The Confusion over an Airport 
Clue, BUILDING A SMARTER PLANET (Feb. 15, 2011, 7:30 PM), https://bit.ly/2T0lakm. 
39. DENNIS V. LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY 115 (2006). 
40. In the case of forensic science, uncertainty in the assessment of comparative 
examination results is already considered an inherent part of the assessment procedure. A 
forensic expert is supposed to report the “best” assessment for the case at hand. It would 
then look redundant to add another level of assessment that attempts to qualify the 
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 The same is true of AI. The confidence score is calculated according 
to the internal mechanism and knowledge of the AI. Standing alone in 
isolation, these measures have no meaning. Here is, for example, the 
explanation of Watson’s confidence measures provided by IBM: 
[Watson] must rank the hypotheses and estimate confidence . . . . We 
adopted a machine-learning approach that requires running the system 
over a set of training questions with known answers and training a 
model based on the scores. . . . For more intelligent ranking . . . ranking 
and confidence estimation may be separated into two phases. In both 
phases sets of scores may be grouped according to their domain (for 
example type matching, passage scoring, and so on.) . . . . [C]ertain 
scores that may be crucial to identifying the correct answer for a 
factoid question may not be as useful on puzzle questions.41 
 Watson’s confidence level for Toronto as an answer “was about 
30%.”42 How is 30% to be evaluated against 20% or 40%, especially when 
the confidence is different for “different question classes”?  
 The confidence numbers, though an objective number calculated from 
a formula, are based on Watson’s knowledge and are meaningful only 
within Watson’s framework. Additionally, as with human experts, the 
confidence level of an AI needs to be accompanied with reasons to be 
useful to humans. Unfortunately, this simply returns us to the earlier 
discussion about the difficulty AI has in explaining itself. 
B. Nearest Neighbors in the Training Set 
 Although it may not be able to provide explanations, what AI can 
provide in principle is the closest precedent in its training set, that is, the 
nearest neighbor precedent. Prior to an exploration of nearest neighbors, 
however, it is necessary to discuss the concept of distance itself. The 
subject matter of distance is extremely complicated, but here we will 
illustrate with simple examples. 
1. Distance and Nearest Neighbor in Geometry 
 We will begin with a review of the concept of vectors, which is 
necessary to understand how AI evaluates distance. Most readers may 
recall the concept of the Euclidean vector, that is, graphically speaking, an 
arrow connecting two points. Figure 3 illustrates three vectors in the 
Cartesian coordinate system. 
 
“goodness” of the expert’s “best” assessment. Nonetheless, the forensic expert would be 
required to explain the particular assessment given and its inherent sources of uncertainty. 
41. David Ferrucci et al., supra note 28, at 74. 
42. Hamm, supra note 38. 
626 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:3 
 
Figure 3: Three Euclidean vectors and the angles between them. 
 
 The three vectors can be expressed in Cartesian coordinates, [x, y], 
and their lengths, according to the most familiar Euclidean distance,43 
calculated.  
  
 
43. This is, in technical parlance, the L2 norm. The reader is encouraged to refer to a 
mathematical text for other Euclidean distances such as the L1 norm and the L∞ norm. 
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Vector 
Cartesian 
Coordinates Length
43 Normalized Coordinates 
ሾ𝑥,𝑦ሿ 𝑙 ൌ ඥ𝑥ଶ ൅ 𝑦ଶ ሾ𝑥/𝑙,𝑦/𝑙ሿ 
𝑟௥௘ௗ [8, 1] 8.0623 [0.9923, 0.1240] 
𝑟௕௟௨௘ [6, 2] 6.3246 [0.9487, 0.3162] 
𝑟௚௥௘௘௡ [2, 8] 8.2462 [0.2425, 0.9701] 
 
 It is sometimes useful to normalize the vectors to all have the same 
length of 1. That way all the vectors in some sense have the same 
importance. The way to do this is to divide the original vector coordinates 
by the length of the vector. We could then obtain the following distance 
between the vectors using the Euclidean distance, where Σ indicates 
summation. 
 
𝑑௥௘ௗି௕௟௨௘ ൌ ඨ෍ሺ𝑟𝑒𝑑௜ െ 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒௜ሻଶ
௜
 
ൌ ඥሺ0.9923 െ 0.9487ሻଶ ൅ ሺ0.1240 െ 0.3162ሻଶ 
ൌ 0.1971 
 
The distances between all three vectors are presented in the following 
table. 
 
Euclidean 
Distance 𝑟௥௘ௗ 𝑟௕௟௨௘ 𝑟௚௥௘௘௡ 
𝑟௥௘ௗ 0 0.1971 1.1305 
𝑟௕௟௨௘ 0.1971 0 0.9624 
𝑟௚௥௘௘௡ 1.1305 0.9624 0 
 
Based on this definition of distance, out of blue and green, blue is the 
nearer neighbor to red. This makes sense geometrically from the diagram. 
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 The Euclidean distance is one of many possible distance metrics, but 
there are also non-Euclidean definitions of distance, such as the hamming 
distance.44 
2. Distance and Nearest Neighbor in Textual Data 
 The above mathematics should be no surprise to anyone who recalls 
their high school geometry class. The concept of the vectors and dot 
products, however, can be used to generate a mathematic measure of 
distance of data as well. Let us consider an example of textual data: 
Lightly Row, Gently Row 
Row, Row, Row Your Boat 
Speed, Bonnie Boat 
 It is possible to convert the phrase data to feature vectors—compact 
summary representations of the phrases’ main characteristics. One way to 
do this is to count the number of times each word appears:45  
 
Phrase 
Lightly 
Row, 
Gently Row 
Row, Row, 
Row Your 
Boat 
Speed, 
Bonnie 
Boat 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s 
Boat 0 1 1 
Bonnie 0 0 1 
Gently 1 0 0 
Lightly 1 0 0 
Row 2 3 0 
Speed 0 0 1 
Your 0 1 0 
Le
ng
th
 
𝑙 ൌ ඥ𝑎ଶ ൅ 𝑏ଶ൅. . . . 2.4495 3.3166 1.7321 
 
The vectors can then be normalized based on their lengths: 
 
44. The reader is encouraged to refer to mathematical texts for such examples. 
45. This sort of textual representation of sentences is known in natural language 
processing as a bag-of-words model. See, e.g., RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 1, at 866. 
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Phrase Lightly Row, Gently Row 
Row, Row, 
Row Your 
Boat 
Speed, 
Bonnie Boat 
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 F
re
qu
en
ci
es
 Boat 0 0.3015 0.5773 
Bonnie 0 0 0.5773 
Gently 0.4082 0 0 
Lightly 0.4082 0 0 
Row 0.8165 0.9045 0 
Speed 0 0 0.5773 
Your 0 0.3015 0 
 
 We can then obtain the distance between the vectors using the 
Euclidean distance. As an example, this is the distance between “lightly 
row, gently row” and “row, row, row your boat.” 
 
𝑑௅ோீோିோோோ௒஻ ൌ ඨ෍ሺ𝐿𝑅𝐺𝑅௜ െ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑌𝐵௜ሻଶ
௜
 
ൌ ඨሺ0 െ 0.3015ሻଶ ൅ ሺ0 െ 0ሻଶ ൅ ሺ0.4082 െ 0ሻଶ ൅ ሺ0.4082 െ 0ሻଶ൅ሺ0.8165 െ 0.9045ሻଶ ൅ ሺ0 െ 0ሻଶ ൅ ሺ0 െ 0.3015ሻଶ  
ൌ 0.7231 
 
The Euclidean distances between all three phrases are presented in the 
following table. 
 
Euclidean 
Distance 
Lightly Row, 
Gently Row 
Row, Row, 
Row Your 
Boat 
Speed, Bonnie 
Boat 
Lightly Row, 
Gently Row 0 0.7231 1.4141 
Row, Row, Row 
Your Boat 0.7231 0 1.2852 
Speed, Bonnie 
Boat 1.4141 1.2852 0 
Based on this definition of distance, out of “row, row, row your boat” and 
“speed, bonnie boat,” “row, row, row your boat” is the nearer neighbor to 
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“lightly row, gently row.” In addition, out of “lightly row, gently row” and 
“row, row, row your boat,” “row, row, row your boat” is the nearer 
neighbor to “speed, bonnie boat.” 
 The mathematical results confirm our intuitive knowledge. “Row, 
row, row your boat,” while sharing the word “boat” with “speed, bonnie 
boat,” is more similar to “lightly row, gently row” than it is to “speed, 
bonnie boat” because the two phrases heavily feature “row.” Likewise, 
“speed, bonnie boat” is more similar to “row, row, row your boat” than to 
“lightly row, gently row” because the two sentences share the word “boat” 
while “speed, bonnie boat” and “lightly row, gently row” have no word in 
common. 
3. Distance and Nearest Neighbor in Other Data 
 The type of analysis seen above is used for other types of data as well. 
Consider, for example, the diagram shown in Figure 4, drawn from a paper 
on fingerprint comparison.46 
Figure 4: Visual summary of Jain et al.’s procedure for analyzing local 
texture in a fingerprint and definition of a feature vector that can be 
compared to a reference collection of FingerCodes.47 
 
46. See Anil K. Jain et al., Filterbank-Based Fingerprint Matching, 9 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON IMAGE PROCESSING 846, 848 (2000). 
47. See id. 
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 Fingerprints may seem very different from text, but the general idea 
of extracting48 and comparing features that underlie so-called fingerprint 
feature extraction and comparison algorithms is quite similar to what we 
discussed above.49 In the approach illustrated in Figure 4, feature vectors, 
referred to as “FingerCodes,” are extracted from input fingerprint images. 
To assess the similarity between a pair of FingerCodes, the Euclidean 
distance is calculated. 
 More generally, applications of distance calculations between feature 
vectors are found in many areas of forensic science.50 
4. Recapitulation 
 Though it is difficult to generalize across all applications of AI, we 
will provide some common observations before we proceed to discuss how 
to evaluate the results of AI in the legal context. As discussed before, AI 
synthesizes a response to a new situation based on the correct or asserted 
responses to known cases. Some comparison of the new situation to the 
known situation is necessary. Typically, this comparison is conducted 
mathematically using feature vectors. How to generate a feature vector 
depends greatly on the application. For example, generating feature 
vectors for fingerprint comparison in a forensic analysis will be very 
different from that for textual comparison in civil discovery. Also, in many 
ways, these methods will be proprietary. 
 But once the feature vectors are generated, the methods of 
mathematically computing distance are generally quite similar. There may 
be many choices of distance definitions, as described above, and the choice 
of distance metric may be governed by the application. What is noteworthy 
is that there will usually be some sort of distance calculation. This is 
common to many AI methodologies. Accordingly, it is not outside the 
realm of technical possibility to demand the operators of AI in legal 
 
48. Of course, the actual generation of the feature vectors in this application is very 
different from the generation of feature vectors for text discussed in Section 2. The various 
algorithms that have been described in the literature rely on different approaches to the 
comparison task. Some approaches focus on extracting configurations of minutiae such as 
features of ridges in fingerprints, while others do not use minutiae, relying instead on 
texture information for example. 
49. However, conducting fingerprint comparisons with machines is considered a very 
difficult problem because images taken from a particular finger do exhibit intra-source 
variations. See DAVIDE MALTONI ET AL., HANDBOOK OF FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 167 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
50. For an illustration, see generally Charles E.H. Berger, Objective Ink Color 
Comparison Through Image Processing and Machine Learning, 53 SCI. & JUST. 55 (2013) 
(assessing and evaluating the similarity of ink colors). 
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decision-making to provide the nearest neighbor within the precedent 
cases. 
C. Using NNA to Evaluate AI Output 
 Having examined how nearest neighbors can, at least in principle, be 
obtained from AI data, we now discuss NNA—the use of nearest 
neighbors to evaluate AI recommendations or decisions. 
 At the outset, the use of nearest neighbors as an analytical concept is 
not unfamiliar to judges and lawyers. Lawyers regularly cite “on point” 
cases in support of their position. At the same time, the duty of candor to 
the tribunal requires lawyers to “disclose to the tribunal legal authority in 
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to 
the position of the client.”51 Lawyers may not simply ignore such adverse 
but “on point” cases; instead, “[they] may challenge the soundness of the 
other decision, attempt to distinguish it from the case at bar, or present 
other reasons why the court should not follow or even be influenced by 
it.”52 The use of nearest neighbors as a way for judges and legal 
practitioners to evaluate AI output is not revolutionary in terms of what 
they already do. 
1. Identification or Individualization 
 The first question in NNA of a particular AI output is whether the AI 
output is in the form of an identification or an individualization. 
Individualization is the assignment of an object to a category that consists 
of a single unit.53 In the process of individualization, an object is compared 
to the precedents that have already been categorized.54 It is then placed in 
a category based on similarities to the precedents determined to be in that 
category and differences from precedents determined to be in other 
 
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
52. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 84-1505 (1984). 
53. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and 
Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 1, 11 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2006-2007 ed. 2006). 
This Article assumes that individualization is indeed possible, though as a decision and not 
as a reporting format for forensic examiners. See also supra notes 14 and 46.  
54. Usually, the precedent cases are categorized by humans or are categorized by AI 
under human supervision. We leave aside here the more complicated case in which 
precedents are categorized by AI without any human review at all.  
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categories.55 Identification is the placement of an object in a category 
consisting of like units.56  
 Both individualization and identification are categorizations and can 
be conveniently illustrated through forensic science applications. Take, for 
example, the statement that a bullet was a .45 ACP. That statement is an 
identification because .45 ACP ammunition is produced in a great variety 
of forms and compositions. Also, there are many different guns that can 
fire this type of ammunition. However, the statement that a specific gun 
fired the bullet in question is, strictly speaking, an individualization.57  
 Throughout this Article, we emphasize this distinction between 
identification and individualization to ensure the clarity of concepts. We 
do note that the two concepts are commonly confused. For example, an 
individualization is often colloquially called an identification, as in the 
term “fingerprint identification.”  
 Underlying identification is the assumption of likeness, meaning that 
objects can be categorized together based on the existence of a common 
set of properties.58 In contrast, underlying individualization is the 
assumption of discernible and ascertainable uniqueness.59 Specifically, the 
object defining the single unit has a distinctive set of properties that no 
other reference object within the same general category can share.60   
 
55. This process does not necessarily require one-to-one comparisons with the 
various category representatives. It may be sufficient to determine the features of the object 
under study and then assign that object to a category if it satisfies the set of features which 
define that category. For example, forensic document examiners may determine the type 
of toner used by a black and white electrophotographic printing system by examining the 
physical properties of the toner present on a questioned document without a direct 
comparison to a reference item. See Alex Biedermann et al., Analysis and Evaluation of 
Magnetism of Black Toners on Documents Printed by Electrophotographic Systems, 267 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Oct. 2016, at 157. 
56. See Paul L. Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, 
& POLICE SCI. 235, 236 (1963); Thornton & Peterson, supra note 53, at 11. 
57. Identification can be an end goal in itself. However, identification can be seen as 
an intermediate step towards individualization. See Kirk, supra note 56, at 236. 
Alternatively, it can be seen as a limiting case of identification. See David H. Kaye, 
Identification, individualization and uniqueness: What’s the difference?, LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK, July 7, 2009, at 86 [hereinafter Kaye, Identification, individualization 
and uniqueness]. Consider the determination that a bullet is fired from a gun belonging to 
a set G consisting of n guns. The determination remains an identification until sufficient 
defining features have been determined to narrow n to only 1.  
58. An identification of any sophistication would also consider the differences of the 
object with objects already determined to be in another class. See Kaye, Identification, 
individualization and uniqueness, supra note 57, at 87 (explaining that “all identifications 
are classifications”). 
59. See C. Champod, Overview and Meaning of Identification/Individualization, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 303 (Max. M. Houck eds., 2013). 
60. See Kirk, supra note 56, at 236 (noting that “[a] thing can be identical only with 
itself, never with any other object, since all objects in the universe are unique”). Note that 
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 The nearest neighbor takes on a very different meaning depending on 
the purpose of the analysis. When one is identifying an object, presumably 
the nearest neighbor precedents to that object belong to the same category. 
If the AI correctly assigned the categorization to the object under study, 
then its categorization should correspond to that of the nearest neighbor 
precedents.61 If the category of the nearest neighbor precedents differs 
from the category assigned by the AI to the object under study, then there 
may be cause for concern. 
 When one is individualizing an object, however, each of the 
precedents is its own category. Because individualization seeks to 
associate the object under study with only one of the precedents and 
thereby assign it to the category associated with that one precedent, all of 
the other precedents can be seen as competing categorizations. The 
precedents that are nearest neighbors to the object, therefore, are the ones 
determined by the AI to be the best competing categorizations. In other 
words, the first nearest neighbor is the best candidate for an 
individualization, the second nearest neighbor is the second best, and so 
on.62 
2. Proximity 
 The previous section briefly touched on the idea that there may be 
divergence in the determination of proximity, or “degree of match,” 
between AI and humans.63 Just because AI deems a precedent to be a 
 
this is an idealistic view. In practice, there are inevitable variations between objects 
assigned to a particular unit category. See id. For example, striation marks on bullets fired 
with the same gun will vary, to some extent, from one bullet fired to the next. This is due 
to the fact that the properties of the inner surface of a gun barrel evolve over time depending 
on factors such as the extent of use of the gun, the cleaning habits, and storage conditions. 
Even reference prints made by the same finger under controlled conditions vary slightly in 
aspects such as clarity and exact spatial arrangement of minutiae due to differences in 
pressure and angle of application. Much of the controversy about forensic science over the 
last decade concerned the foundations of individualization, and whether practitioners are 
actually capable of reliably achieving individualizations. See Kaye, Identification, 
individualization and uniqueness, supra note 57, at 88–90 (explaining by statistical 
example that an expert is “very likely” to individualize a bullet to a gun, but may not do so 
with 100% accuracy). 
61. This assumes that the system has a rich enough knowledge base regarding the 
scope of categories and category representatives. For a thorough discussion on nearest 
neighbor precedents, see infra Section III.C.2. (discussing proximity).  
62. This is an abstract idea of individualization, however. As we will explain later 
through examples, there are multiple obstacles, intrinsic to the objects under study, that 
adversely affect the performance of such procedures. In particular, ultimate “calls” made 
by human operators regarding individualization may be made with candidates other than 
the first nearest neighbor. See infra Section III.C.2. (discussing proximity).   
63. For that matter, different AI programs operating from different definitions of 
distance will differ from each other in their determinations of proximity. 
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nearest neighbor to the particular object at hand does not mean that the 
precedent is actually close to the object in human eyes. For example, it is 
possible that the AI does not have a precedent case that corresponds to the 
current object or, in other words, the current object is a matter of “first 
impression” to the AI. Also, AI is using its own metrics to judge distance, 
which may not directly align with human impressions of distance. Phrased 
differently, AI may “see” something that distinguishes the nearest 
neighbor precedent from the present case, even if the distinguishing factors 
are not obvious to humans. 
 In the context of identification,64 there is also the possibility of 
divergence in the category associated with the nearest neighbor precedent 
and the AI-assessed category for the current object. In general, one would 
expect that the AI would place the object into the same category associated 
with the nearest neighbor. But that may not always happen. 
Notwithstanding proximity of a current object to a nearest neighbor 
precedent, the other precedent cases may direct the AI to place the current 
object into a category different from that of the nearest neighbor.  
 Human perception of distance is generally taken as the gold standard, 
given the current state of AI development. Take, for example, the problem 
of glasses for facial recognition software. Few humans would believe that 
the faces shown in Figure 5 belong to different people. 
 
Figure 5: Example of image perturbation, presented by Sharif et al.,65 
based on an image of actor Owen Wilson. 
However, some AI facial recognition algorithms fail to relate the two, 
finding a lack of proximity that does not exist for the human observer.  
 Nevertheless, AI assessment should be approached with due respect. 
AI can “see” patterns where humans cannot and thereby outperform 
 
64. This problem does not occur in the context of individualization because each 
precedent has its own individual category. See Kirk, supra note 56, at 236. The AI 
assessment for the current object is the category associated with the first nearest neighbor 
precedent. 
65. See Mahmood Sharif et al., A General Framework for Adversarial Examples with 
Objectives, ACM TRANSACTIONS ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY, June 2019, at 16, 16. 
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humans. For example, AI can identify indications of Alzheimer’s before 
the symptoms are perceptible to humans.66 
3. Proximity in Individualization Problems 
 Having introduced the distinction between identification and 
individualization and the concept of proximity, we are now ready to 
combine the concepts together. We will start with the problem of 
individualization. Individualization seeks to associate the object under 
study with only one of the precedents and thereby assign it to the category 
associated with that one precedent. At present, AI systems that support 
individualization processes will generally present a menu of 
recommendations, all of which are near neighbors of the object under 
study, for its human operators to pick. The precedent picked by the humans 
is the ultimate decision. 
 There are two NNAs that can be helpful to probe the decision. The 
first is to consider the nearest neighbors of the object under study. If one 
accepts the top recommendation—the first nearest neighbor of the object 
under study—it would be extremely useful to consider the other nearest 
neighbors, as illustrated in Figure 6(a). If there is a second nearest 
neighbor that is indistinguishable to human eyes, or nearly so, this should 
prompt caution against making an individualization decision with the first 
nearest neighbor. At the least, the human decision-maker should carefully 
consider arguments as to why the second nearest neighbor has not been 
retained. In contrast, if the second nearest neighbor looks completely 
unlike the first nearest neighbor, it may also be a cause for concern that 
the AI does not have sufficient precedent cases and categories. If one does 
not accept the top candidate, however, there should be articulable reasons 
for skipping over that first nearest neighbor. The further one goes down 
the list of nearest neighbors in picking a match, the more one should be 
skeptical. 
 The second NNA, illustrated in Figure 6(b), also considers the nearest 
neighbors of the precedent picked by the human within the precedent set. 
Unlike the previous NNA, which searches for the nearest neighbors of the 
current object, this analysis searches for the nearest neighbor of the 
selected precedent and is concerned with the nearest neighbors of a nearest 
neighbor.  
 
66. See Sulantha Mathotaarachchi et al., Identifying incipient dementia individuals 
using machine learning and amyloid imaging, 59 NEUROBIOLOGY AGING, Nov. 2017, at 
82–84. 
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Figure 6: (a) Illustration of nearest neighbors of a current object, with 
the plain dot representing the nearest neighbor, that is, the selected 
precedent. (b) Illustration of the nearest neighbors of a selected 
precedent. 
  
 The nearest neighbors of the selected precedent can then be compared 
to the object under study in order to see whether these nearest neighbors 
look proximate to the object under study. We can recognize two extremes: 
(1) when the nearest neighbors of the selected precedent do not 
appear to be proximate to the object under study; and 
(2) when the nearest neighbors of the selected precedent appear 
as proximate to the object under study as the selected 
precedent itself. 
 In situation (1), the selected precedent can be considered an isolate. 
On the one hand, it may indicate that there is indeed something unique to 
that precedent that does not conflict with the individualization decision. 
On the other hand, one should keep in mind the size of the precedent set 
within which the search is conducted, which may be too limited.  
 In situation (2), the selected precedent can be considered to be in a 
“crowded” field. It may indicate reason to be skeptical of making an 
individualization decision. Most scenarios would fall somewhere in 
between the two extremes. 
4. Proximity in Identification Problems 
 Let us now examine how NNA can be used in identification problems. 
We can recognize three extreme situations: 
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(1) when the nearest neighbor precedent is proximate to the 
object under study and when the category of the nearest 
neighbor precedent corresponds to the AI assessment for the 
object under study; 
(2) when the nearest neighbor precedent is proximate to the 
object under study and when the category of the nearest 
neighbor precedent does not correspond to the AI assessment 
for the object under study; and 
(3) when the nearest neighbor is not proximate to the object under 
study and has the same or a different classification label. 
 Figure 7 provides schematics of these three situations in the context 
of a binary decision67 involving a sharp decision boundary.68 
 
67. That is, a system with only two categories. In reality, there can be multiple 
categories. 
68. In reality, the decision boundaries can be gradual and not sharp. For example, one 
need not designate between “fast” or “slow”; one can have “fast,” “not very fast,” and 
“slow.” 
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Figure 7: (1) Illustration of an AI assessment for a current object that 
corresponds to the tagged outcome of the nearest neighbor. (2) 
Illustration of an AI assessment where the nearest neighbor tag does 
not correspond to the current object. (3) Situation in which the nearest 
neighbor is “far” away. Note that the tag of the nearest neighbor in 
the latter case may correspond to or be different from that of the 
object under study. 
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 Situation (1) represents the easiest case. If the AI output for a 
proximate current object corresponds to the category of the nearest 
neighbor precedent, then the AI output may, in this instance, be regarded 
as trustworthy as the category of the nearest neighbor precedent. The AI 
output may then be adopted or followed based on that basis. 
 Let us now consider situation (2). The fact that the category for the 
proximate nearest neighbor precedent is different from the AI output for 
the object under study indicates that the current case is a borderline case. 
There is also the possibility that the AI may not be drawing the decision 
boundary well. Consequently, there is a need to question the AI output or 
to bolster the training of the AI to refine the drawing of the decision 
boundary. It is also possible that the classification scheme is not granular 
enough. For example, a new category may be needed for the object under 
study. 
 Finally, we consider situation (3), where the distant nearest neighbor 
category may be different from one of the objects under study. This is a 
sign that the current case is a matter of “first impression” to the AI. The 
question then becomes one of whether to trust the AI. The AI output for 
the object under study may not be wrong; however, the AI output should 
be treated with skepticism. 
 It should be noted that situations (1), (2), and (3) are extreme 
situations. It is easy to imagine intermediate situations where, for example, 
the nearest neighbor is not proximate but is not too far from the current 
case. The treatment of such intermediate situations would require 
appropriate adaptations of the treatment of the extreme situations. 
IV. POTENTIAL OF NNA IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING INVOLVING AI 
A. Civil Discovery 
 The discussions in this section will start with the use of AI in civil 
discovery because it is readily accessible and relatively uncontroversial. 
Under U.S. rules of civil procedure, a party may obtain documents 
“relevant to [his or her] claim or defense” by propounding document 
requests.69 The responding party is then generally required to produce non-
privileged documents responsive to the requests.70 Traditionally, human 
attorneys representing the responding party review the document sets to 
determine what documents to produce. In large cases, this human review 
of documents can be extremely time-consuming and costly. 
 
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
70. Id. 
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 AI technologies, falling under the more general umbrella of 
technology assisted review (“TAR”), are now being used to assist in this 
process.71 The idea of TAR is not to remove humans from reviewing 
documents, but rather to reduce the burden of human review. The process 
of training the AI follows the standard template of decision by precedence, 
as seen in the following description: 
For the software to begin classifying documents as to relevance, 
documents that are representative of relevant content must be 
identified and submitted to the computer [by the responding party]. For 
many supervised machine learning methods, documents that are 
representative of nonrelevant content must also be identified and 
submitted [by the responding party]. Once a set of relevant and 
nonrelevant examples have been submitted, the software analyzes their 
features and builds a predictive model, a classification system that 
categorizes or ranks documents in the TAR set.72 
The precise reduction of human effort with the use of TAR depends on the 
particular review. As an unwritten rule of thumb, the typical TAR process 
can reduce the number of documents to be reviewed by humans by a third. 
 Although there are many TAR processes which differ from each 
other, it should be noted that they are close to automated decision-making. 
While human reviewers will review some of the documents reviewed by 
TAR to check for the validity of the processes,73 they will not review every 
single AI output for each of the documents. Instead, they will accept the 
bulk majority of the responsiveness determinations made by AI. 
 At the time of writing, no U.S. court has ever found any specific TAR 
review process to be invalid.74 That is not surprising, given that the 
traditional metrics of recall and precision are commonly accepted metrics 
for such a determination.75 However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
court has encountered a case where a TAR process is called into question 
for failing to produce a specific responsive document or documents. 
Likewise, no court has encountered a case of malicious TAR usage, where 
the human reviewers taught the AI to avoid a specific category of 
 
71. For more about the details of TAR, see TIMOTHY T. LAU & EMERY G. LEE III, 
TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED REVIEW FOR DISCOVERY REQUESTS 2–5 (2017). See also BOLCH 
JUD. INST., TECHNOLOGY ASSISTED REVIEW (TAR) GUIDELINES 1–5 (2019).  
72. BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 71, at 10. 
73. See id. at 25–26. 
74. See id. at v. Note, however, that courts have also resisted compelling unwilling 
parties to use TAR. See Hyles v. New York City, No. 10 Civ. 3119, 2016 US Dist. LEXIS 
100390, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016). 
75. See BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 71, at 5. 
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responsive documents or hid documents that the AI specifically identified 
as responsive.  
 Therefore, let us consider a situation where the responding party used 
a TAR process to produce documents and the propounding party found, 
through independent means, a document that should have been produced. 
The document was reviewed by the TAR process, identified as 
unresponsive, and was not produced by the responding party. The court is 
then asked by the propounding party to sanction the responding party for 
the failure.  
 In such a situation, it may be helpful to conduct an NNA. Specifically, 
the nearest neighbor precedent to the document in question within the 
training set can be identified and the categorization of the precedent 
examined. In view of the fact that TAR processes are identification tools 
to categorize documents as responsive or unresponsive to a specific 
document request, the principles outlined above in Section 4 can be 
applied: 
(1) If the nearest neighbor precedent is similar to the document 
in question and the nearest neighbor is classified as 
unresponsive, then there may be reason to think that the 
training conducted by the responding party was deficient. 
(2) If the nearest neighbor precedent is similar to the document 
in question and the nearest neighbor is classified as 
responsive, then there is reason to think that the document in 
question is a borderline case. In such an instance, the failure 
to produce the document may reflect an inherent limitation in 
the system’s operability. Inaccurate outcomes are to be 
expected even in systems which generally perform to 
satisfaction. 
(3) If the nearest neighbor precedent is not at all similar to the 
document in question, then the document in question is an 
outlier with regard to the training data. It may indicate that 
the training set was not representative of the overall document 
population. Alternatively, it may be that the document in 
question is an outlier within the entire document population 
altogether. 
 The NNA-based inspection can be extended by considering other 
nearest neighbor precedents beyond the first nearest neighbor precedent. 
B. Risk Prediction 
 RPIs are actuarial tools used to assess whether individuals pose a 
criminal risk. Within the United States, RPIs have been used by probation 
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officers to determine how to supervise offenders and, more recently, by 
courts to help determine sentencing.76 There are many similar tools which 
vary in complexity and sophistication. One RPI that has drawn attention 
in the media is COMPAS,77 which provides “risks scales for general 
recidivism, violent recidivism, and pretrial misconduct.”78 The system is 
used in some state jurisdictions, such as Wisconsin79 and Michigan.80 In 
this discussion, COMPAS will be taken as representative of RPIs. 
 Many RPIs are not transparent.81 COMPAS, for example, is 
proprietary; the inner workings of the software are not publicly known.82 
It is not entirely clear how the system is trained. The official 
documentation gives no information on the data used to develop the 
general recidivism scale. However, the official documentation does state 
that the violent recidivism scale is based on a “large sample of probation 
and presentence investigation . . . cases,” but no further detail is 
provided.83 As for the underlying algorithm, the documentation states that 
“[t]he methods used to develop both [recidivism] risk scales are described 
in various books on regression modeling and machine learning,” giving 
citations but not entering into specifics.84 
 Although little is known about the internals, there is information 
about how the user interacts with COMPAS. The end user, usually a 
 
76. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 752–53 (Wis. 2016). 
77. See, e.g., Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than 
Random People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2TcrHak; Jason Tashea, Courts 
are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:00 
AM), https://bit.ly/2HY1Aiv. COMPAS is an acronym that stands for “Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions,” but the RPI is rarely referred 
to with its full name. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORRS., FIELD OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION, 
ADMINISTRATION AND USE OF COMPAS IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 2 
(2017), available at https://bit.ly/2PpmcEg.  
78. NORTHPOINTE, INC., PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 26 (2015), 
available at https://bit.ly/2w5ZB90. 
79. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 752–53. 
80. MICH. DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 77, at 9. 
81. On the notions of openness and transparency in relation to the use of algorithms 
in legal contexts, see Jason M. Chin et al., Open Forensic Science, J. LAW & BIOSCIENCES, 
July 2019, 284–85 and Megan T. Stevenson & Christopher Slobogin, Algorithmic Risk 
Assessments and the Double-Edged Sword of Youth, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 703–05 
(2018). For arguments in support of public availability, see, for example, Brandon Garrett 
& John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, 103 
JUDICATURE, no. 2, Summer 2019, at 1, 47–48. 
82. See Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting 
Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES, no. 1, Jan. 2018, at 3. 
83. NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 78, at 28. 
84. Id. at 13; see also NORTHPOINTE RES. & DEV. DEP’T, COMPAS SCALES AND RISK 
MODELS VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY: A SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM INTERNAL AND 
INDEPENDENT STUDIES 4 (2010) (“Standard logistic regression was used to predict 
recidivism with the full set of variables in each candidate set.”). 
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probation officer, fills out a questionnaire of “137 questions that are either 
answered by defendants or pulled from criminal records.”85 The officer 
then enters the questionnaire into the system, and COMPAS provides a 
risk score.  
 It must be emphasized that, at this time, no RPI is known to 
completely automate decision-making. After all, RPIs are concerned with 
prospective risk management.86 With respect to sentencing, for example, 
courts also need to consider the role of sentencing as retrospective 
punishment of crime, which is not a factor considered by RPIs.87 Instead, 
the scores RPIs generate are evaluative suggestions that are used to guide 
the decision-making. The documentation for COMPAS, for example, 
explicitly acknowledges the possibility of disagreement with the scores by 
stating that, “[s]ometimes the COMPAS risk score for a particular person 
does not match the practitioner’s expectations or clinical judgment 
regarding the level of risk posed by that person.”88 Indeed, it anticipates 
that disagreement will occur with some frequency: 
It is also important to note that we would expect staff to disagree with 
an actuarial risk assessment (e.g. COMPAS) in about 10% of the cases 
due to mitigating or aggravating circumstances which the computer is 
not sensitive to. In those cases[,] staff should be encouraged to use their 
professional judgment and override the computed risk as appropriate—
documenting it in COMPAS with the Override Reason—for 
monitoring by supervisory staff.89 
 The literature is replete with discussions about whether RPIs are 
accurate or fair.90 This Article does not delve into controversies over their 
statistical foundations, their operational suitability, nor their relative merit 
with respect to individual clinical evaluations.91  
 
85. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to 
Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/32sIlaa. 
86. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A NATIONAL WORKING GROUP 
4–5 (2011). 
87. See id. at 5–6. 
88. NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 78, at 28. 
89. Id. at 31. 
90. See Anthony W. Flores et al., False Positives, False Negatives, and False 
Analyses: A Rejoinder to “Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to 
Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks,” FED. PROB., Sept. 2016, at 38, 
44; Angwin et al., supra note 85; Dressel & Farid, supra note 82, at 3. 
91. For a detailed critical discussion, see Peter B. Imrey & A. Philip Dawid, A 
Commentary on Statistical Assessment of Violence Recidivism Risk, 2 STAT. & PUB. POL’Y 
25, 39–41 (2015). 
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 What is important to note, as is repeated throughout this Article, is 
that a bad system can make a good recommendation and a good system 
can make a bad recommendation. None of the discussion in the literature 
helps evaluate the quality of a particular recommendation provided by an 
RPI. Regardless of the validity of RPIs, there needs to be some way to 
evaluate the quality of their recommendations at the individual level. 
Recurrent claims that these instruments can be “validated” before use and 
“revalidated” over time simply miss this basic point. What NNA can do 
here is provide an inherently empirical check on individual candidate 
conclusions and, hence, is neither a rival nor a substitute to standard 
measures of validity. 
 Consider the standard use case of a probation officer or a judge being 
given a score for the recidivism risk of a particular defendant. NNA can 
be used to evaluate the score as follows. The nearest neighbor of a current 
defendant is the defendant in the training data, who is most similar to the 
current defendant based on the distance metric inherent within the RPI. 
Whether the nearest neighbor did or did not recidivate is a known fact. The 
probation officer or the judge can, therefore, use this known fact to help 
assess the RPI score for the current defendant. 
 It should immediately be clear that RPIs are identification tools, used 
specifically to place the defendant within a particular risk category. For 
example, the documentation for COMPAS states that: “[r]isk assessment 
is about predicting group behavior (identifying groups of higher risk 
offenders) - it is not about prediction at the individual level. Your risk 
score is estimated based on known outcomes of groups of offenders who 
have similar characteristics.”92 
 In accordance with the principles outlined in Section 4, we can 
consider the following situations: 
(1) If the nearest neighbor is indeed similar to the current 
defendant and the known fact of the recidivism is actually not 
in conflict with the RPI score, then the nearest neighbor 
inspection does not raise a doubt about the RPI score. 
(2) If the nearest neighbor is similar to the current defendant and 
the known fact of the recidivism disagrees with the RPI score, 
then there is reason to think that the current defendant is a 
borderline case. In such an instance, there may be reason to 
conduct further inquiry about the current defendant. 
 
92. NORTHPOINTE, INC., supra note 78, at 31. 
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(3) If the nearest neighbor is not at all similar to the current 
defendant, then there may be reason to disregard the RPI 
score altogether, as the system would need to be regarded as 
having no knowledge about the recidivism status of 
individuals close enough to the defendant.  
 As is the case of civil discovery, the NNA can be extended by 
considering other nearest neighbor precedents beyond the first nearest 
neighbor precedent.  
 The use of nearest neighbor, to a degree, reduces the need for a 
definitive settlement of RPI validity. At present, decision-makers who are 
skeptical about RPIs give the scores they receive little weight, while those 
who believe in the validity of the tools trust the scores as useful 
information. This divergence in treatment of RPI scores cannot be 
considered an optimal outcome, as it results in uneven justice.  
C. Forensic Comparison 
 NNA can also be useful in forensic science comparison.93 Forensic 
science can be thought of as “the application of scientific or technical 
 
93. The lay reader should not confuse machine-supported forensic comparison with 
identity verification. See MALTONI ET AL., supra note 49, at 3. For example, fingerprints 
may be used to identify a criminal from a crime scene or to verify a user to unlock a smart 
phone. Both applications may involve similar algorithmic architectures, but they serve 
rather distinct purposes. In the forensic comparison context, the machine output is typically 
a list of candidate sources for the input biometric data, ranked according to the degree of 
similarity between the questioned biometric data and the biometric features of each 
candidate. As explained in the main text, a human forensic examiner then “boils down” the 
list of candidates and—if possible—reports one candidate as the potential source of the 
questioned mark. As such, the machine is essentially a sorting device. In contrast, in the 
identity verification mode, a biometric system would typically provide a binary decision—
a categorical association or exclusion of the input biometric features to a given reference 
entry. For an overview see, e.g., Christophe Champod & Damien Dessimoz, Linkages 
Between Biometrics and Forensic Science, in HANDBOOK OF BIOMETRICS 425 (Anil K. Jain 
et al. eds., 2008).  
The two applications involve fundamentally different design demands. In classic 
forensic identification, a one-to-many search is conducted. For example, a fingermark 
retrieved from a crime scene is compared against a database of ten-print cards. In contrast, 
verification involves a focused one-to-one comparison. For example, a person’s input 
fingerprint on a phone scanner is compared against the reference fingerprint previously 
taken by that exact same scanner stored in the phone. The problem of verification is 
fundamentally “easier,” involving better input data and simpler binary decisions of 
acceptance or rejection of identity claims. This is not the case for procedures seeking to 
“identify” the source of a crime scene fingermark.  
In addition, the social consequences of error are vastly different. A person wrongly 
rejected by a fingerprint biometric verification system may have to call a technician to 
unlock the system after human verification of his or her identity. But these inconveniences 
pale in comparison to the consequences of a bad forensic comparison. A person wrongly 
associated with a fingerprint at a crime scene will at least be the target of a criminal probe, 
and at worst may be put to trial or sent to prison. 
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practices to the recognition, collection, analysis, and interpretation of 
evidence for criminal and civil law or regulatory issues.”94 Forensic 
science examinations, especially in the so-called comparison disciplines,95 
generally involve comparing objects of unknown source from a crime 
scene with reference items.96 The work is conducted to direct investigatory 
efforts at the known owners of the reference objects or to assist legal 
decision-makers in reaching ultimate determinations of guilt regarding 
owners. 
 Some forensic comparison focuses on identification, such as drug 
identification and taxonomy in wildlife. NNA for these types of forensic 
comparisons are conceptually similar to NNA for other identification 
tasks, which is covered by the previous sections about civil discovery and 
risk prediction. To avoid repetition, this section focuses on forensic 
comparisons that pertain to individualization.97 In these comparisons, the 
objective is not to place an object within a category of like objects, but to 
associate it with a specific source.98  
 To do their work, forensic science examiners do not simply “match” 
objects. This is because there is virtually never a perfect congruence or 
correspondence between compared objects.99 Instead, examiners focus on 
 
94. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016).  
95. Not all forensic science tasks involve comparisons. Examples that do not involve 
comparisons in the traditional sense include accident reconstruction, blood spatter 
analyses, and autopsies. 
96. The nature of these entities may be biometric, such as ridge skin characteristics, 
DNA, ear, face, and iris, as well as physical traces, that is, marks and impressions left by 
items such as shoes, tires, firearms, and tools. 
97. This Article also focuses on individualization because it is a task that currently 
attracts most criticisms. Individualization tasks are controversial mainly because they can 
provide strong evidence to associate defendants with case-relevant stains or marks and 
thereby can have severe consequences. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Symposium, From the 
Crime Scene to the Courtroom: A Discouraging Omen: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Approved Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print 
Discipline, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1103 (2018). 
98. See Kirk, supra note 56, at 236; Thornton & Peterson, supra note 53, at 11. 
99. This is true even of DNA analysis, commonly thought of as involving exact 
matches. During DNA analysis it may happen that, for various reasons, additional 
signals—indicative of genetic features—are recorded, while there is also a possibility that 
some features that should appear in a profile go undetected, leading to an incomplete or 
partial profile. The occurrence of such phenomena depends on, among other things, the 
quality and amount of the DNA available for analysis and the performance of the 
laboratory. See, e.g., Tacha Hicks et al., A Framework for Interpreting Evidence, in 
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 37, 70 (John S. Buckleton et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2016). Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the observed features look “too good 
to be true” in the context of the case, which should give rise to a suspicion that the evidence 
has been fabricated or tampered with.  
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evaluation, which is based on measurement of the objects of interest and 
the observation of similarities and differences.100 Examiners characterize 
the extent of correspondence which may vary from few similarities and 
many differences to many similarities and few differences. What they seek 
to do in evaluation is to assess the probative value of observed similarities 
and differences.101 It is in this evaluative aspect of examination work that 
AI can play its role. Simply put, information about objects is fed to AI as 
input, and AI algorithms provide a measure of the distance between the 
compared objects. This distance is expressed, for example, in terms of a 
comparison score. 
 After evaluation comes decision. That is, a legal decision-maker—
with the assistance of the report or testimony of examiners—decides 
whether the candidate object (rather than an unknown source) is in fact the 
source of the questioned item. After all, any statement in terms of observed 
similarities and differences between compared objects, generated by either 
human examiners or AI, is only a measurement of distance. Current 
forensic AI systems, even when augmented with additional work done by 
examiners, do not cover this decisional step in an autonomous way.102  
 For illustration, consider a forensic fingerprint comparison system 
that searches a partial fingermark collected on a crime scene against a 
database. 0 provides an example of such a search. As can be seen in Figure 
8, such a system will provide a list of “candidates,” ranked according to 
their degree of proximity to the questioned mark. We can call these 
candidates “nearest neighbors” in the same sense used throughout this 
Article. Clearly, this ranked list will contain a top-ranked candidate, the 
first nearest neighbor. But the AI does not “identify” persons as sources of 
fingermarks used as evidence in criminal proceedings.103 Rather, human 
examiners are needed to exercise their judgement to determine which 
candidate from the AI-generated list, if any, to report as the potential 
source of the questioned mark. They may take into consideration their own 
personal inspection of the nature, quality, and quantity of corresponding 
 
100. This is particularly important where the input information is difficult to process, 
such as pattern evidence like fingermarks and tool-marks. For an example, see the 
illustration provided in Section III.B.3. 
101. Within the forensic area, probative value is elicited by assessing the extent to 
which the findings in the comparisons are more compatible with one proposition (e.g., the 
compared items come from the same source) rather than an alternative proposition (e.g., 
the compared items come from different sources). 
102. But, note again, that there are applications that do make decisions autonomously, 
such as access verification problems. However, these are not core forensic science tasks 
considered in this section. See also supra note 93.  
103. For a more detailed illustration, see 0. 
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features used by the fingerprint searching system. They may also consider 
any additional features that, due to complexity and level of detail, are not 
taken into account by the system.104 Ultimately, the legal decision-maker, 
based on the work product of the examiner and other pieces of evidence, 
makes the ultimate decision. 
 These contemporary machine-based approaches are, therefore, not 
autonomous decision systems.105 Instead, they are used as sorting systems 
that provide human examiners with potential candidates, each 
accompanied with a measure of distance with respect to the input data. 
Even then, the work of the human examiners is but one piece of evidence 
that informs the legal decision of a judge or jury. 
 It is unlikely in the near to medium term that AI systems capable of 
fully-automating the work of human examiners can be built. In a study 
conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology on the 
performance of experts and AI in facial recognition, the authors 
concluded:  
The results of the study point to tangible ways to maximize face 
identification accuracy by exploiting the strengths of humans and 
machines working collaboratively. First, to optimize the accuracy of 
face identification, the best approach is to combine human and 
machine expertise. Fusing the most accurate machine with individual 
forensic facial examiners produced decisions that were more accurate 
than those arrived at by any pair of human and/or machine judges. This 
human–machine combination yielded higher accuracy than the fusion 
of two individual forensic facial examiners. Computational theory 
indicates that fusing systems works best when their decision strategies 
differ. Therefore, the superiority of human–machine fusion over 
human–human fusion suggests that humans and machines have 
different strengths and weaknesses that can be exploited/mitigated by 
cross-fusion.106 
What we may expect to see as AI continues to improve is the increasing 
“cross-fusion” of human and AI expertise. This will allow AI to boost, but 
 
104. For example, the AI may focus on so-called level 2 features (e.g., major ridge 
path features) while the human examiner may also consider level 3 features (e.g., shape of 
pores and relative position of pores). 
105. The fact that such systems are not intended to be used as autonomous decision 
systems does not mean that they cannot be used as autonomous decision systems. As 
explained in Section B, deference to systems can convert them from recommendation-
makers to decision-makers. This can be considered a type of AI misuse. 
106. P. Jonathon Phillips et al., Face Recognition Accuracy of Forensic Examiners, 
Superrecognizers, and Face Recognition Algorithms, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., June 
2018, at 6171, 6174 (internal citation omitted). 
650 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:3 
not supplant, the work of human examiners by serving as a second set of 
eyes. 
 Therefore, we will focus on AI as used in the evaluative step of 
forensic individualization. For the legal decision-maker, NNA is useful for 
scrutinizing the trustworthiness of the candidate source selected with the 
help of AI. In other words, before asking to what extent the observed 
similarities and differences between the trace of unknown source and the 
candidate source are probative,107 it is relevant to inquire about why the 
particular candidate source rather than another member of the list of 
candidates has been retained. This is a rarely considered aspect in current 
fingerprint practice and court adjudication. 
 As before, we can consider a number of situations, in accordance with 
the principles outlined in Section 3. To simplify the discussion, we 
continue to use fingerprints as an example. First, the candidate fingerprint 
chosen by the examiner among the initial candidate list is a nearest 
neighbor to the trace. But it is not necessarily the case that the examiners 
would pick the first nearest neighbor as the candidate.108 Therefore, it may 
be useful for the legal decision-maker to inquire about the existence of 
other nearest neighbors and their ranks compared to that of the selected 
candidate. The reasons they have been discarded may be illuminating. 
Similarly, the meaning of the absence of a suitable nearest neighbor needs 
to considered with respect to the number of data points available to the 
comparison system. For example, the larger a dataset, the more likely it is 
to find appropriate nearest neighbors. 
 If the number of nearest neighbors that the examiner passed over to 
identify the candidate is larger than the number of nearest neighbors 
passed over in a typical comparison, this should raise some suspicion as to 
the suitability of the selected candidate for consideration. Conversely, if 
the number of nearest neighbors that the examiner passed over to identify 
the candidate is smaller than the number of nearest neighbors passed over 
in the typical comparison, this would be something we would expect to 
see if the selected candidate is indeed the source of the questioned item.109  
 
107. Ideally, we would want comparison scores to be typical for one proposition, and 
not the other, and vice-versa. In reality, a neat separation is rarely possible. Some 
comparison scores may be observed under both competing propositions. 
108. See Appendix A for a real case example where the examiner faced several 
nearest neighbors. 
109. It is important to keep in mind that these are qualitative considerations. The 
examiner will still need to assess the probative value based on the actual comparison score 
assigned to the selected candidate, that is, considering how the actual score compares with 
scores from same source comparisons versus different source comparisons. 
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 Second, the nearest neighbors of the candidate fingerprint can be 
considered. As discussed in Section 3, there can be two extremes in the 
outcome. The first of these two extremes is that the nearest neighbors to 
the candidate fingerprint do not resemble the candidate fingerprint in the 
pertinent details. Encountering such a situation depends, of course, on the 
size of the pool of fingerprints available for search by the AI as well as the 
diversity or distinctiveness of their feature configurations. But if the 
system does not find fingerprints that resemble the candidate fingerprint 
in the pertinent details, then that is an empirical suggestion that those 
details are rare or distinctive within the search pool. 
 The second extreme is that the nearest neighbors of the candidate 
fingerprint look similar to the candidate fingerprint in terms of the 
pertinent details. In this situation, the AI output can be thought of as 
challenging the proposition that the candidate fingerprint and the 
fingerprint under study are from the same source. After all, the computer 
system is pulling up good competitors to the candidate fingerprint. As 
noted previously, it may be valuable in such a case to inquire about the 
reasons that led the examiner to choose the particular candidate source 
rather than one of the good competitors. 
 It must be noted that, even though the NNA process as outlined here 
can assist in the evaluative step of discriminating between competing 
propositions,110 it is not sufficient to allow for categorical assertions about 
whether or not the trace came from the same source as that of the 
reference.111 Making such an assertion to “identify” a particular person as 
the source of the trace is a decision which, as already stated, involves value 
judgement.112 That is more than NNA can support. 
 Nonetheless, NNA could usefully complement current forensic 
examination protocols. In fact, the most widely known and practiced 
protocol, the so-called “Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation–Verification” 
 
110. There are already a few available computerized systems that provide assistance 
in the kind of evaluation described in this Article. An example includes PiAnoS, short for 
“Picture Annotation System,” an open-source software-package developed at School of 
Criminal Justice at the University of Lausanne. See CHAMPOD ET AL., supra note 30, at 46. 
For another example, see Henry J. Swofford et al., A Method for the Statistical 
Interpretation of Friction Ridge Skin Impression Evidence: Method Development and 
Validation, 287 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 113,  (2018). 
111. That is true of the entire comparison process in general. Indeed, some forensic 
laboratories, including the U.S. Defense Forensic Science Center, have declined to state 
conclusions that “identify” a particular person as the source of a given fingermark. See 
DEF. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INFORMATION PAPER NO. CIFS-FSL-LP, 
USE OF THE TERM “IDENTIFICATION” IN LATENT PRINT TECHNICAL REPORTS 1 (2015). 
112. See Biedermann & Vuille, supra note 14, at 399. 
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(“ACE-V”),113 devotes little attention to how the candidate retained for the 
comparison process was selected. In particular, ACE-V does not inform 
about the existence of close competitors to the selected candidate, nor does 
it encourage examiners to look actively for competing candidates. The 
example mentioned in Appendix A illustrates that extended searches can 
lead to surprising turns in actual cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Law is about the life and liberty of individuals. As such, for legal 
applications, good decision-making in the aggregate is not enough. The 
legal system aims not only to deliver good performance in the aggregate 
but also quality outcomes at the granular level: each opinion, sentencing 
decision, and verdict. As AI systems are increasingly adopted to assist or 
automate legal decision-making, it is important to have ways to gauge the 
quality of individual output of AI systems. 
 AI systems capable of explaining individual recommendations or 
decisions do not yet exist and may not exist for a very long time. For now, 
this Article argues that NNA is helpful for probing AI output used in the 
process of generating candidate conclusions in the evaluative step, as part 
of their own decision-making, and also for reviewing AI automated 
decisions. This Article explains how the methodology is useful for both 
individualization and identification problems, providing use cases to show 
what it can do. Though among the primary aspirations of the legal process, 
the insight into the actual quality of individual decisions remains—in 
practice—essentially inaccessible. NNA is not a “magic wand” to 
overcome this intricacy. We encourage lawyers, decision-makers, and 
regulators to critically observe the nature and explainability of AI output 
in current and future developments. At this time, however, NNA can be 
used for a case-specific and practically feasible challenge to AI output 
used to support legal decision-making. This should be of interest to all 
participants of the legal process who consume AI output. In addition, as 
NNA is fundamentally based on the use of comparison to precedents, it 
should be familiar to and easily adopted by legal professionals who are 
well acquainted with the classic analogical reasoning of the common law 
system. 
 This Article ends with a reminder. NNA may be used to help make 
up one’s mind about what to think about AI output, such as whether a 
 
113. See PAUL LEE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8215, 
FORENSIC LATENT FINGERPRINT PREPROCESSING ASSESSMENT 2 (2018); CHAMPOD ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 34.  
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convict is a high recidivist risk or whether a recovered fingermark comes 
from a particular person. What it cannot do, however, is provide direct 
guidance about what humans should do with the AI output. Ultimately, 
decision-making relies on value judgments on the part of humans. 
Decisions made by machines are the result of the way in which humans 
instruct the machines. Human decision-makers must take responsibility 
for the use of AI and cannot separate themselves from the consequences 
of particular decisions. 
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APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE OF A FINGERMARK COMPARISON 
 Figure 8 shows an example screenshot of a comparison of a poor-
quality fingermark against a database of over one million reference 
fingerprints using a current forensic fingerprint comparison system. The 
comparison was done for research purposes at the School of Criminal 
Justice at the University of Lausanne. The image on the top-left in Figure 
8 shows a fingermark, the infamous Latent Fingerprint Number 17 (“LFP 
17”), that was recovered on a bag containing explosive devices in Madrid 
following terrorist bomb attacks on several commuter trains on March 11, 
2004.114 LFP 17 has now been determined to belong to Ouhnane Daoud, 
an Algerian national, whose right middle fingerprint is shown centered on 
the top in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Illustration of the result of a computer-assisted comparison 
of a fingermark against a database of fingerprint references.115 The 
top-left image shows the input fingermark whereas the top-middle 
(and bottom-left) image shows the reference fingerprint with the 
highest score (i.e., degree of similarity). Both images are publicly 
available. The list on the top-right contains the 30 highest scoring 
candidate fingerprints. Preview-images of the candidate fingerprints 
ranked 2nd, 3rd, and 4th are masked (images at the bottom). 
 
114. Before LFP 17 was attributed to Ouhnane Daoud by the Spanish National Police, 
the FBI’s Latent Print Unit attributed it to Brandon Mayfield, a U.S. citizen. For a summary 
of Mayfield’s arrest and subsequent litigation, see Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 
(9th Cir. 2010). When LFP 17 was processed by the FBI, the resulting candidate list ranked 
a reference print from Mayfield in position 4 out 20. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE 
BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 31 (2006). 
115. Courtesy of Marco De Donno and Professor Christophe Champod, School of 
Criminal Justice, University of Lausanne. 
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 This example illustrates a few key-points regarding the computer-
assisted information processing in forensic (fingerprint) comparisons. 
First, due to the limited quality of the input information and the large 
number of comparisons conducted,116 it is not surprising to find closely 
resembling candidate reference prints, called look-alikes in the practice.117 
In our example search, Daoud’s fingerprint scored first among the 30 
candidates, listed on the right, with a score of 14’153. The second-ranked 
candidate has a similarity score of 14’083, which is quite close to Daoud’s 
score.  
 Second, the members of the candidate list of reference prints will 
generally show lower degrees of similarity when the quality of the input 
fingermark is poorer.118 The reason for this is that a low-quality mark 
offers a feature set with reduced discriminative capacity. 
 Third, it is thus clear that the limitations inherent in the input 
information represent a major hindrance to autonomous identification. At 
this time, computer systems are not allowed to render identification 
decisions; they are only used to help retrieve similar candidates for further 
one-to-one comparison by human examiners. 
 Therefore, AI output in the context of forensic fingerprint 
examination does not amount to an identification decision, but rather a 
series of similarity assessments for multiple potential candidates. With 
regard to the topic discussed throughout this Article—how to assess AI 
output—the question of interest is what to conclude from a particular 
similarity assessment. This question is discussed in Section III.C.4.  
 
 
116. Over 1.2 million in the particular search conduced for the purpose of the 
illustration presented here as compared to the several millions conducted by the FBI in the 
Mayfield case. Compare De Donno, supra note 115,  with OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 114, at 1. 
117. See Davide Maltoni et al., Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems: From 
Fingerprints to Fingermarks, in HANDBOOK OF BIOMETRICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE: 
ADVANCES IN COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 37, 52 (Massimo Tistarelli & 
Christophe Champod eds., 2017). 
118. See id. 
